This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics.Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90:629-650. Rubinstein, A . (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining game. Econometrica, 50:97-109. Ruffinanbsp;...
|Title||:||Topics in Microeconomics|
|Publisher||:||Cambridge University Press - 1999-10-28|