Contents - 1. Introduction; Part I. Origins of the State - 2. The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency; 3. The reason for collective choice - redistribution; Part II. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy - 4. The choice of voting rule; 5. Majority rule - positive properties; 6. Majority rule - normative properties; 7. Simple alternatives to majority rule; 8. Complicated alternatives to majority rule; 9. Exit, voice and disloyalty; Part III. Public Choice in a Representative Democracy - 10. Federalism; 11. Two-party competition - deterministic voting; 12. Two-party competition - probabilistic voting; 13. Multiparty systems; 14. The paradox of voting; 15. Rent seeking; 16. Bureaucracy; 17. Legislatures and bureaucracies; 18. Dictatorship; Part IV. Applications and Testing - 19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance; 20. Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying; 21. The size of government; 22. Government size and economic performance; Part V. Normative public choice - 23. Social welfare functions; 24. The impossibility of a social ordering; 25. A just social contract; 26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract; 27. Liberal rights and social choices; Part VI. What Have We Learned? - 28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?; 29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice.Contents - 1.
|Title||:||Public Choice III|
|Author||:||Dennis C. Mueller|
|Publisher||:||Cambridge University Press - 2003-02-17|