My second essay, Generic Stability of Economic Equilibria, is theoretical. Using singularity theory, this paper explores the generic properties of Nash, Walrasian, and other economic equilibria. The results show that for any game among finite number of players with differentiable utility functions, Nash equilibria and Walrasian market equilibria are isolated points. The paper examines the effects of equity based refinements like envy free points and egalitarian equivalence. The results show that there are special examples where equilibria exist but not generically. The results of this paper are applicable to the effects of strong dependence amongst market agents. The results of this paper extend to shed light on the complexity of computation.My second essay, Generic Stability of Economic Equilibria, is theoretical.
|Title||:||Essays on the Political Economy of Conflict and Growth|
|Author||:||Amer Naim Aladhadh|
|Publisher||:||ProQuest - 2008|