In the third chapter, I construct a new measure that tightens the link between stock return patterns around quarter-ends and the likelihood that these patterns result from mutual fund portfolio pumping. Both the level and the concentration of mutual fund ownership explain temporary stock price increases at the end of the quarter. I show that pumping is particularly pronounced among the best- and worst-performing funds and document a distinctive increase in this activity during the 1997--2001 period. The sharp decrease in portfolio pumping after 2001 is most likely due to academic and media attention that spawned investor activism and SEC enforcement actions. These changes in regulatory attention and scrutiny markedly affected the behavior of mutual fund managers.Second, the SECa#39;s Rule 10b-18, which provides issuers with a asafe harbora from liability for manipulation when they ... placed a market buy order for 80, 750 shares of BIF at 3:57 p.m. EST, which constituted 76.18% of the daya#39;s trading volumeanbsp;...
|Title||:||Essays on Agency Conflicts in Mutual Funds|
|Author||:||Truong Xuan Duong|
|Publisher||:||ProQuest - 2008|