This report examines the failure of the UK banks. The Committee begins by examining how the present position came about. After looking at the economic situation the report addresses the fate of those banks now partly or wholly owned by the Government, comparing their experiences with those of the building societies. This analysis identifies several key factors as triggering this crisis. First, the growth of risk and complexity, with a concomitant growth in profit, meant that too few people (including many of those in charge) had a clear idea of what was on the banks' books. Second, the banking sector became over-reliant on wholesale funding and discounted any possibility that the wholesale market would dry up; third, rapid growth in the sector was facilitated by increased leverage. The Committee praises the response of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme which had to cope with a dramatic surge in its workload to help compensate those savers in failing institutions. The package of measures the Government has taken to address the problems in the banking sector is then examined and the Committee offers its initial view on these measures. The Government's multi-billion pound stake in the banking sector is being managed by UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI) and the next section looks at its early work. Finally the report looks at the future of the banking sector, to see if structurally steps can be taken to limit the possibility of another banking crisis.First, the growth of risk and complexity, with a concomitant growth in profit, meant that too few people (including many of those in charge) had a clear idea of what was on the banksa#39; books.
|Author||:||Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Treasury Committee|
|Publisher||:||The Stationery Office - 2009|